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"The world is running out of available, clean freshwater at an exponentially
dangerous rate. . . ."' A recently released report by the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) states that by 2030,
47% of world population will be living in areas of high water stress and if present
trends continue more than two thirds of the world population may still be withoutS • 2
improved sanitation. There are even genuine concerns that water could be
treated as a commodity much like oil or other minerals, and that water cartels
may spring up on the international stage, drastically changing the landscape for
countries, corporations, and citizens.' These fears have manifested themselves in
an ongoing debate over the future of water delivery systems, and whether public
* J.D., University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred May 2010. A special thanks
to Professor Stephen McCaffrey for his help and guidance in making this comment possible.
1. MAUDE BARLOW, BLUE COVENANT: THE GLOBAL WATER CRISIS AND THE COMING BATTLE FOR THE
RIGHT TO WATER 29 (The New Press 2008) (2007).
2. Press Release, United Nations Educ. Scientific and Cultural Org., New Report Highlights Crucial
Role of Water in Development (Mar. 12, 2009).
3. BARLOW, supra note I, at xi.
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or private control over these systems is preferable. At the core of this water
privatization debate is the matter of who ultimately controls the distribution, and
what price consumers pay.
In the United States, publicly owned systems account for more than ninety
percent of all U.S. water production.4 In addition, rates are some of the lowest in
the developed world at just over 50 cents per cubic meter.5 In part, this has a
great deal to do with the existing infrastructure in the United States, which is far
more advanced than many developing nations, as well as its steady tax base and
reduced rates of corruption. Nations of the Global South6 do not have these same
advantages that allow municipalities in the United States to successfully manage
their systems. These struggling nations face difficulties on all sides, many having
high rates of corruption and inefficiency in their publicly controlled systems, yet
noticeably wary of the threat of expensive services and public discontent with the
prospect of privatized systems. Some commentators have even classified
attempts to privatize once public assets as a serious threat to future generations.7
The prospect of privatization is not entirely negative, however. Privatizing water
systems can be attractive from a government's perspective with incentives
including improvement, development, and expansion of infrastructure, increasing
efficiency of water supply and distribution, and development of technical
expertise!
Given the decreasing amounts of potable water around the world and rapid
population growth, the legal issues surrounding water allocation and distribution
will be a future battleground of vital importance. Some of the focus will
inevitably center on tensions between the private and public sector and the
underlying philosophy of water distribution. At the nexus between basic contract
law and national sovereignty, between private rights and public duties, there
stands this controversial and complex issue of water privatization.
This Comment will focus on a number of distinct legal issues that arise from
the privatization of water in the Global South. First, this Comment will explore
4. The National Academies' Water Information Center, Drinking Water Basics, http://water.
nationalacademies.org/basics-part_5.shtml (last visited Mar. 15, 2009).
5. Richard Soultanian, Worldwide Survey Reveals Water Costs Rising, 19 WATER & WASTEWATER
INT'L 7 (Oct. 2004), available at http:H/www.waterworld.com/indexdisplay/article-display/215862/s-articles/s-
water-wastewater-intemationalls-volume- 19/s-issue-7/s-features/s-worldwide-survey-reveals-water-costs-
rising.html.
6. Countries of the Global South is a term generally used to describe lesser developed nations that are
usually, though by no means exclusively, found south of the equator. This designation includes many African
and South American countries including the United Republic of Tanzania, Bolivia, and other nations discussed
in this Comment. For more information on the Global South See U. N. Comm. on South-South Cooperation,
Special Unit for South-South Cooperation, Forging a Global South: United Nations Day for South-South
Cooperation (Dec. 19, 2004), available at http://tcdc.undp.org/doc/Forging a Global South.pdf.
7. Huey D. Johnson, Whose Earth Is It Anyway?, UN CHRONICLE VOLUME 39 ISSUE 3, Sept. I, 2002, at
9, available at http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2002/issue3/0302p8-unconventional.html.
8. Celine Ruben-Salama et al, Thirsty for Change: Considering Water Privatization in Developing
Nations, CONSILIENCE: THE COLUM. J. OF SUSTAINABLE DEV., Spring 2008, at 90.
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the existing water distribution landscape and how current international rules and
norms provide incentives for developing countries to privatize their systems.
Second, this Comment will explore notable ways in which privatization has
failed in some nations as well as the difficulties encountered and remedies
available to both nations and corporations involved in these failed endeavors .
Third, this Comment will examine the human right to water as articulated by the
United Nations and individual countries, and whether the existence of this
independent right carries with it any legal consequences. Finally, this Comment
will explore the viability of alternative public/private systems, some theoretical
and some which have proven successful in other countries.
I. LENDING LEVERAGE: THE INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK
ENCOURAGING PRIVATIZATION
Water policy is left to the determination of each sovereign nation where the
water is distributed as the "development of water resources management policy,
as with all government policy, is the sovereign function of national states."9
Theoretically, then, each nation should investigate which type of water
distribution system most benefits its people, then try to implement that system
efficiently and effectively. This is only an idealistic model, however. Many
countries, especially those in the Global South, lack the capital to construct the
infrastructure and delivery systems necessary to provide fresh water to their
citizens. In need of this capital and in response to the demands of its people,
countries without funding for such projects seek it in the international arena
through a variety of sources. Most commonly, nations needing capital try to
attain at least some of that funding through the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF).
The World Bank is not a bank in the common sense, but rather a
development institution owned by 186 countries.'0 As part of its mission, the
World Bank via the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA) provides low-
interest loans as well as interest free credits and grants to developing countries
for a wide variety of purposes, including infrastructure and natural resource
management."
The IMF, on the other hand, has a broad scope of activities, only one of
which involves lending. The IMF provides loans to countries experiencing
financial difficulties, enabling these countries to stabilize their currencies,
9. Nile Basin Initiative, Water Resource Planning and Management Project, http://wrpmp.nilebasin.org/
index.php?option=comcontent&task= view&id= 18&Itemid=44 (last visited Mar. 15, 2009).
10. World Bank-About Us, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNALIEXTABOUTUS/0,,
pagePK:50004410-piPK:36602-theSitePK:29708,00.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2009).
11. Id.
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continue paying for imports, and restore conditions for strong economic growth.'2
In contrast to other international lending institutions and development banks such
as the World Bank, , the IMF does not lend for specific projects. 3
While these institutions are designed to provide the very assistance needed
by struggling nations, the support and capital of these organizations does not
come without restriction. One major tool these two groups have at their disposal
is conditionality in lending, which can be used to encourage particular goals set
by the World Bank and IMF. In this context, conditionality is defined as "the
application of specific, pre-determined requirements that directly or indirectly
enter into a donor's decision to approve or continue to finance a loan or grant.
'
'
4
Sometimes the prescribed terms are simply triggers and benchmarks, , but they
can also include an element of mandatory privatization.' 5 In fact, "for more than a
decade the IMF has included privatization as a standard condition of its structural
adjustment lending."'' 6 This focus on privatization is part of what is commonly
referred to as the Washington Consensus, a set of economic policy reforms
focusing on developing nations in crisis and considered desirable by several key
Washington D.C. institutions. 7
Policies of the World Bank, the IMF and larger industrialized countries
making foreign investments strongly encourage, if not outright demand,
increased privatization across the board, including water distribution and
purification.' 8 Given the capital needs of these struggling nations, international
groups like the IMF, World Bank, and even regional development banks (as well
as the nations that back them) have a certain amount of leverage over smaller and
less fiscally established countries. Because of their situation, desperate
government leaders will often eagerly adopt policies they may not necessarily
agree with in order to secure necessary resources.' 9 This lending leverage can
create both internal and external conflict for a country seeking capital. Internally,
leaders may have difficulty attempting to provide their citizens with basic water
12. International Monetary Fund-IMF Lending (2009), http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/exr/facts/
howlend.htm.
13. Id.
14. Benedicte Bull, Alf Morten Jerve, & Erlend Sigvaldsen, The World Bank's and the IMF's use of
Conditionality to Encourage Privatization and Liberalization: Current Issues and Practices, SUM REPORT No.
13 (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo Conditionality Conference), Nov. 2006, at vi.
15. See Conditionality in Development Policy Lending, OPERATIONS POL'Y AND COUNTRY SERVICES
(World Bank), Nov. 15, 2007,$ 13,$ 41 [hereinafter Conditionality in Lending].
16. Nancy Brune, Geoffrey Garrett, & Bruce Kogut, The International Monetary Fund and the Global
Spread of Privatization, 51 IMF STAFF PAPERS 195, 199 (2004) [hereinafter IMF STAFF PAPER].
17. John Williamson, What Washington Means By Policy Reform, in LATIN AMERICAN ADJUSTMENT:
How MUCH HAS HAPPENED? (John Williamson ed. 2002) (1990), available at http://www.piie.com/
publications/papers/print.cfm?doc=pub&ResearchlD=486.
18. See IMF and World Bank Push Water Privatization and Full Cost Recovery on Poor Countries,
NEWS & NOTICES FOR IMF AND WORLD BANK WATCHERS, Spring 2001, at 22 [hereinafter NEWS & NOTICES],
available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/IMF-WB%20promote%20privatization.pdf.
19. Id. at 23.
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service while simultaneously trying to attract foreign capital and keep its
international loan commitments. Meeting these obligations may require rate hikes
or service changes often disfavored by their own citizens. In some cases, these
rate hikes and service changes have resulted in outright protest and revolt by
those who have been affected. Externally, these nations may have difficulties
interacting with the corporations running the privatized water systems, and by
extension may face criticism from the nations where those corporations are
centered.
Much focus has been given to the difficulties and potential negative
ramifications of water privatization. Rate increases may make water unaffordable
to the poor, some neighborhoods and groups can lose access to water, and any
resultant profits from the system will inevitably leave the community.20 In
addition, once a government privatizes its water system, withdrawing from the
deal is difficult and can subject the government to complicated international
litigation or arbitration. 2' However, it would be in error to claim that privatization
is always detrimental to a nation's interests. In addition to the potential benefits
of increased efficiency and reduced corruption, one study found that
conditionality has important ancillary economic benefits not commonly cited.
The value of privatized assets in IMF debtor countries increase as measured by
investor willingness to pay more for those privatized assets because investors see
adoption of pro-privatization policies as "a signal of credible policy reform."
22
This increased willingness to invest creates more capital that is very beneficial to
23these countries.
While the ultimate impact of privatization of a nation's water distribution
system can vary from case to case, the lending leverage possessed by the World
Bank and IMF appears to be undisputed. "By the early 1990s, the World Bank,
the International Monetary Fund and other regional development banks. . .were
encouraging poor countries to let the big European water corporations run their
water systems for profit.. .and by 2006, the vast majority of loans for water were
conditional on privatization. 24 Developing countries are often desperate for
foreign capital, and the World Bank (as well as private investors who look to
Bank involvement as a seal of approval) makes such infusions possible. As a
result the IMF and World Bank, the two most prominent organizations involved
in this type of lending, are at the forefront of the privatization and lending
leverage controversy.
20. Food and Water Watch, Top 10: Why Water Privatization Fails (June 2006), http://www.
foodandwaterwatch.org/water/private-vs-public/Top 1OWhyPrivatizationFails.pdf.
21. See, e.g., Aguas del Tunari S.A. v. The Republic of Bolivia and Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. V.
United Republic of Tanzania, ICS1D Case No. ARB/05/22, available at http://icsid.worldbarsk.org/
ICSID/Index.jsp (follow "Cases" link and search by case number) (case discussed in detail later in this
Comment).
22. IMF STAFF PAPER, supra note 16, at 195.
23. Id.
24. BARLOW, supra note 1, at 38.
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A. Specific Legal Arrangements and World Bank/IMF Policies Encouraging
Privatization
The IMF and World Bank have several different categories of loan
conditions with corresponding degrees of leveraging power.2 The three main
categories of agreements in descending order of private controls are concession
agreements, lease agreements, and management contracts. Under a concession
agreement, the private company is responsible for everything including setting
customer and tariff rates, labor, and expanding the infrastructure.26 These
contracts are typically of longer duration than the other types and at termination,
control over the assets remains with the private entity.27 Under a lease agreement,
the company also derives its revenues from customer fees and has control over
both the tariff structure and labor, however these can be shorter in duration than
concession agreements, may or may not include infrastructure development, and
usually specify assets revert to the state at termination. Finally, under a
management agreement, the private company receives a set fee for managing the
distribution system but control of all fees, rates, and assets remain with the state.29
In addition to these three basic categories, the World Bank also maintains
policies discouraging government subsidies and encouraging a plan of full cost
recovery. 3° The notion of full cost recovery "implies that the water consumers
should cover the cost of operating, maintaining, and expanding the water utility
as needed."'" There is some sensitivity as to whether under a privatized system
full cost recovery includes a reasonable rate of return on investment for the
participating private company, but it seems private companies do include this
reasonable profit margin in their recovery figures. As part of its pure full cost
recovery goal, the World Bank also discourages government subsidization of the
water systems.33 This is a questionable demand given that industrialized nations
such as the United States provide substantial public subsidies to water and
sanitation services. 34 If and when these contracts fail for whatever reason, ousted
companies or angry nations may resort to legal remedies, but in the international
context this is far more difficult and complicated than in a purely domestic
setting.
25. NEWS & NOTICES, supra note 18, at 22.
26. Id. at 26 (Box 10).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 22.
31. Id. at 27.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 28.
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II. LEGAL REMEDIES AND ICSID
When difficulties with privatization programs go beyond that which the host
government finds acceptable, both countries and companies have resorted to
legal efforts to solve their problems. There have been several instances where
countries have challenged and canceled contracts with existing water service
providers, and the corporations have fought back.
Suits involving nations and foreign corporations can be quite complex.
Among the potential complicating factors are jurisdiction, forum non conveniens,
taking of evidence, foreign sovereign immunity and the enforcement of
judgments. Layers of complexity include the additional costs of enforcement,
uncertainty about the ability to enforce contractual rights, risks arising from
unfamiliarity with foreign legal process, and the risk of unknown and
unpredictable legal exposure.35 While disputes over venue and jurisdiction are
present in domestic litigation as well, such disputes are of a different order, and
frequency, when cross border transactions are involved.36 Some of these issues
can be, and often are, avoided by dispute resolution clauses in concession
agreements, which commonly choose arbitration rather than litigation.
The primary cases in the field of water distribution contracts have been
adjudicated in the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID). ICSID, a part of the World Bank Group, is an international institution
established under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
between States and Nationals of Other States and has more than one hundred
forty member States.37 ICSID's main function is "to provide facilities for
conciliation and arbitration of international investment disputes"3 and is "the
leading international arbitration institution devoted to investor-State dispute
settlement., 39 . Like all arbitral institutions, "recourse to ICSID facilities is
always subject to the parties' consent., 40
Despite the voluntary consent requirement, "foreign investors generally have
been able to submit to international arbitration claims against host states alleging
violations of a BIT, even where those violations arose out of a contract including
an exclusive choice-of-forum clause designating local remedies.' It is also
important to note that although ICSID and Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs)
35. Honourable J.J. Spigelman, AC Chief Justice of New South Wales, Address to the 166 Inter-Pacific
Bar Association Conference: Transaction Costs and International Litigation (May 2, 2006), available at
http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.auAawlink/Supreme-Court l-sc.nsf/pages/SCO-spigelman020506.
36. Id.
37. International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/
AboutlCSIDHome.jsp (last visited Oct. 4, 2009).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Aguas Del Tunari, S.A. v. Republic of Bolivia. ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3.,
101 AM. J. INT'LL. 179, 182 (2007).
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are often referenced as if they cover the same territory, they are distinctly
different concepts . ICSID itself is regulated by the convention as described
above, while BITs are independent treaties that offer investors certain
protections, often including consent of the host nation to participate in ICSID
arbitration.4 ' This has important consequences for the possibility of withdrawal
from the ICSID Convention discussed later.
The following cases from Tanzania and Bolivia, both of which were argued
and decided before ICSID tribunals, provide good illustrations of how these
disputes are decided.
A. Bolivia: Rapid Rate Increases and Popular Revolt Leads to ICSID
Arbitration and Jurisdictional Challenges
In the late 1990s, Bolivia attempted to privatize the water service in
Cochabamba, the nation's third largest city." The privatization agreement was
eventually reached with Aguas del Tunari S.A. (AdT) whose principal owners
were foreign investors.4'5 AdT's largest shareholder, which owned 55 percent of
AdT's shares, was a subsidiary company incorporated in the Cayman Islands but
owned by Bechtel, a U.S. company.4 Bechtel also inserted three tiers of Dutch
companies into the chain of ownership between itself and its subsidiary.47
The concession agreement was immediately controversial within the local
community as many feared dramatic rate increases.48 Within weeks of taking
over, AdT raised rates by more than 50 percent and in many cases much higher. 9
These price hikes were met with fierce public protest, forcing the Bolivian
government to declare a state of martial law.50 The government subsequently
forced Bechtel to leave the country and ownership of the water company was
transferred back into public control.5 In response, AdT claimed violation of the
Netherlands-Bolivia Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) and requested ICSID
arbitration.
While the more political and social aspects of the Cochabamba water protests
are well documented, the eventual ICSID arbitration of Aguas del Tunari v.
42. Marco E. Schnabl & Julie B6dard, The Wrong Kind of 'Interesting', NAT'L L. J., July 30, 2007,
available at http://www.arbitralwomen.com/files/publication/1910231238362.pdf.
43. Id.
44. Vandevelde, supra note 41, at 179.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 180.
48. Id. at 179.
49. Press Release, Earth Justice, Bechtel Surrenders in Bolivia Water Revolt Case (Jan. 19, 2006),
http://www.earthjustice.orglnews/press/006/page.jsp?itemlD=27533393 [hereinafter Earth Justice].
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See Vandevelde, supra note 41, at 179.
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Republic of Bolivia illustrates a more basic difficulty that corporations have in
obtaining relief for cancellation of these service contracts: establishing
jurisdiction. After the Concession Agreement was canceled and AdT brought a
claim for relief to ICSID, Bolivia challenged jurisdiction on several grounds.
First, Bolivia asserted that it did not consent to jurisdiction and that that the
arbitration clause in the Concession Contract precluded ICSID jurisdiction. In
response, the Tribunal dismissed this claim stating the dispute settlement
provision in the Concession Contract did not constitute an explicit waiver of
ICSID jurisdiction.53 Next Bolivia argued that it was not the proper party to the
dispute, and that in fact the proceeding should have been instituted against the
Water Superintendency of Bolivia which was the entity that took all the actions
at issue including rescission of the Concession Agreement. 4 The Tribunal
dismissed this claim stating that attribution to the State of actions of the Water
Superintendency would be determined in the merits phase.5
Bolivia also asserted that Article 2 of the BIT under which the suit was
brought should be interpreted to recognize the exclusive jurisdiction of Bolivian
law over the dispute.56 In response, the Tribunal rejected this interpretation. 7
Next Bolivia argued "that the transfer of the Claimant's stock from a Cayman
Islands holding company to a Luxemburg company barred the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal because the transfer should have been authorized by Bolivia."58 The
Tribunal held that the migration of the holding company did not constitute a
breach of the Concession Contract and therefore did not defeat jurisdiction of the
ICSID.5 9
Finally, Bolivia objected to jurisdiction "on the ground that the Claimant was
not a 'national' of The Netherlands as defined in the BIT insofar as it was not
'controlled directly or indirectly' by nationals of The Netherlands." 60 Bolivia
alleged that "control" referred to the ultimate controller, which was in fact
Bechtel, a U.S. company. 6' After extensive analysis the Tribunal "found that the
Dutch entities.. .were not corporate shells established for the purpose of
obtaining ICSID jurisdiction, and that the control requirement under the BIT was
met.
, 62
These jurisdictional objections were argued and briefed before ever reaching
the substance of AdT's claims. While domestic litigants are also forced to deal
53. Ucheora Onwuamaegbu, Introductory Note, Aguas del Tunari SA v.The Republic of Bolivia (ICSID
Case No. ARB/03/2), 20 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INVESTMENT L. J. 446 (2005).
54. Id. at 445.
55. Id. at 446.
56. Id. at 445.
57. Id. at 446.
58. Id. at 445.
59. Onwuamaegbu, supra note 53, at 446.
60. Id. at 445.
61. Id. at 446.
62. Id.
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with jurisdictional challenges, the types of arguments made in this context create
a layer of complexity which can potentially make relief more difficult and
expensive to obtain. Had the Tribunal ruled against AdT based on any one of the
above arguments proffered by Bolivia, it would have been without legal remedy
or recourse. Aguas Del Tunari, S.A. v. Republic of Bolivia illustrates that
establishing the right to argue your case in a particular forum can be highly
complex and time consuming in the international context. Companies seeking to
establish service contracts such as this need to be aware that their corporate
structure and actions may have a significant impact on jurisdictional challenges
during ICSID arbitration. States should also take note of the types of
jurisdictional objections raised by Bolivia in the proceeding. Even though their
jurisdictional challenges failed in this instance, the Tribunal's thorough
discussion and analysis shows that on different facts, such arguments may
succeed in the future.
B. Tanzania: Inadequate Preliminary Information and Failure to Realize
Profits Leads to ICSID Arbitration and Jurisdictional Challenges
In 2003, the Republic of Tanzania was awarded $140 million by the World
Bank and other development institutions for the purpose of instituting a
comprehensive program of repairs, upgrades, and expansions of the water and
sewage infrastructure and distribution in Dar es Salaam. 63 The Republic was
required to appoint a private company to manage and operate the system as one
of the conditions of receiving World Bank funds, and eventually chose Biwater
Gauff Tanzania (BGT).6' Serious problems were encountered in the performance
of the contract from the start, including BGT's poorly prepared and ill-informed
bid and numerous management and implementation difficulties. 6 It would be
unfair to blame the problems entirely on privatization, however. Even before this
privatization initiative, the water situation in Dar es Salaam was precarious. 66 The
conditions in Dar es Salam echoed some of the more common complaints about
publicly controlled water systems, including poor management, lack of resources,
increased demand and insufficient capital expenditures.67 In addition, the tariffs
imposed on users had historically been very low. In fact, before 1991, water was
provided without charge to users.'
After considerable difficulties and a failed renegotiation, the Republic
terminated the contract, senior management was deported, and government
63. Biwater Gauff (Tanz.) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanz., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, 2008 WL
4619779, 3 (2006) [hereinafter Biwater Gauff].
64. Id. 113-4.
65. Id. 486.
66. Id. 96.
67. Id.
68. Biwater Gauff, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, 2008 WL 4619779, T 96.
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officials seized the company's assets and installed new management.69 BGT
brought arbitration proceedings in ICSID, claiming that these events constituted
the expropriation of BGT's investment and were a breach of the Tanzania's
international and domestic obligations.0 The ICSID Tribunal agreed that the
various actions of Tanzania amounted to an expropriation of BGT's investment,7'
however BGT's claims for damages were dismissed, and the ruling in favor of
BGT was merely declaratory in nature .
As in Aguas Del Tunari, S.A. v. Republic of Bolivia, this arbitration involved
considerable jurisdictional difficulties. Much like courts in the United States,
ICSID tribunals must analyze and establish their jurisdiction before tackling
substantive matters. In order to establish whether it had jurisdiction, the Tribunal
examined Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention to determine whether the
dispute was: (1) legal, (2) arising out of an investment, (3) between a contracting
state and a national of another contracting state and, (4) whether the parties had
consented in writing to the submission.73
Two of these elements were essentially undisputed, as the tribunal
determined that the claims contained in the complaint were legal in nature,74 and
that the parties to the dispute were a state (Tanzania) and a United Kingdom
company (BGT).75 Tanzania and the UK were both parties to the convention and
therefore both are considered contracting states.
However, Tanzania initially disputed the jurisdiction of the ICSID Tribunal
on a number of other grounds.76 Tanzania claimed its grievances did not arise
directly out of an investment within the meaning of Article 25 of the ICSID
Convention,77 while BGT argued that given the duration, regularity of profit, risk,
substantial commitment, and development surrounding the water privatization
project, it should be deemed an investment as required by the convention."
Tanzania also adamantly contended that the consent in writing requirement was
not satisfied. Tanzania claimed the Tanzanian Investment Act of 1997 (TIA) was
controlling and that jurisdiction was not necessarily satisfied under the TIA. 9
They also claimed that even under the BIT, BGT had not attempted to resolve the
dispute through alternative means as required." However, the tribunal disagreed'
69. Id. 15.
70. Id. 16, 18.
71. Id.A 519.
72. Id. 807.
73. Biwater Gauff, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, 2008 WL 4619779, 1 230.
74. Id. 1 232.
75. Id. 246.
76. Id. 1286.
77. Id. 287.
78. Biwater Gauff, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, 2008 WL 4619779, in 233-234, 519.
79. Id. 286.
80. Id.
81. Id. 255.
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and determined that requirements of consent in writing came in the form of a
bilateral investment treaty (BIT) which stated that each party to the BIT consents
to submit to ICSID any legal dispute between the parties relating to investments
as described above.82
A common thread in both Aguas Del Tunari S.A. v. Republic of Bolivia and
Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. V. United Republic of Tanzania is the persistent
challenge of ICSID jurisdiction. Substantively, however, Biwater Gauff can be
readily distinguished from the Bolivia case. Biwater Gauff was not the end result
of a popular revolt or high tariff increases, but rather a breakdown in information
prior to inception of the project which led to a complete lack of profitability on
all sides. Biwater Gauff v. Tanzania demonstrates that foreign investors who
establish a profit margin going into the privatization project in water distribution
may be forced to reevaluate their returns given that there are a number of
unknowns regarding existing infrastructure. Investors also need to be aware that
when countries are faced with a choice between significant rate increases or
terminating the contract, the latter seems to be the preferred approach. In
addition, while privatization was attached as a condition of the World Bank loan
procured for the project, it seems that Tanzania was not at all initially opposed to
the inclusion of a private foreign corporation. In fact, the nation openly
acknowledged that the inclusion of such an actor may be a necessity given the
poor state of the Dar es Salaam water and sewer system. This is in stark contrast
to Aguas del Tunaris, where there was apprehension about the inclusion of a
private company from the very beginning.
C. Synthesizing ICSID Case Studies
These two cases are prime examples of what happens when privatization
programs in developing nations become untenable. While determinations of
ICSID tribunals are necessarily fact-based and will vary from case to case, some
general conclusions and patterns can be derived from both the Bolivia and
Tanzania cases.
First, it appears that jurisdiction in ICSID cases dealing with service
contracts will be a hotly contested issue, and therefore both corporations and
nations should plan accordingly. Countries brought before ICSID will seemingly
challenge jurisdiction on multiple grounds whenever possible, even though one
of the goals of the ICSID Convention was to establish a forum precisely for these
types of disputes. Second, when privatization programs lose favor with host
nations' citizens, countries will inevitably rescind the agreement rather than upset
their own people. Finally, in both instances the rulings of ICSID tribunals, while
technically in favor of the petitioning corporation, were primarily declaratory in
nature. After winning its jurisdictional arguments, in 2006 AdT/Bechtel settled
82. Id. (H 251-53, 257.
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their claims for a token payment that amounts to thirty cents. 3 A somewhat
similar result followed in Tanzania, where the tribunal determined that that none
of the Republic's violations of the BIT caused the loss and damage for which
BGT requested compensation, and therefore the claims for damages were
dismissed and the ruling could only be declaratory in nature.8M While a token
settlement and a declaratory ruling may be considered a victory by some, it is
unlikely that the companies and their shareholders were fully satisfied with those
results. Even when the results of the arbitration are favorable to states however,
the issues underlying the need for ICSID arbitration can lead to reaction and
backlash from individual nations.
D. Future Applications: Is Bolivian Withdrawal a Trend?
The Republic of Bolivia's confrontation with Bechtel was not the final
chapter of that nation's brush with water privatization. In May of 2007, Bolivia
formally withdrew from the ICSID Convention, which is the first time a
contracting nation has formally denounced the Convention.5 The Bolivian
government believed ICSID favors multinational corporations over governments,
and officials are quoted as saying that "there is no record of any fee or sanction
imposed by ICSID to any transnational for failing to comply with agreements. 8 6
Bolivia's withdrawal from the treaty governing ICSID may have consequences
beyond a mere signal of their discontent.
Despite Bolivia's actions, it is possible that withdrawing from the ICSID
would not preclude or foreclose the possibility of future arbitration at ICSID. 7
The reason is that governments have signed bilateral investment treaties that are
independent of the ICSID convention, but which contain consent clauses which
still theoretically subject them to ICSID arbitration (sometimes exclusively)."
Nations would have to also denounce those treaties to fully withdraw.8 9
Nonetheless, several countries primarily in South America have threatened
withdrawal and begun to examine alternatives to the ICSID. Nicaragua has given
mixed signals on this front, saying that the nation was looking closely at
Bolivia's experience before determining its next step.90 However, as some
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indication of their position, for the last year Nicaragua has stopped referring to
ICSID in its investment treaties. 9' Venezuela has sent similarly mixed signals.
Last year the National Assembly passed a resolution approving Venezuela's
withdrawal from ICSID, but soon thereafter requested an ongoing dispute
regarding oil fields return to ICSID.92 Despite these moves, to date both
Nicaragua and Venezuela remain ICSID members. 93
Though Bolivia is the only nation to officially withdraw to date, this does not
mean countries are not exploring alternatives. In July of 2008, several South
American nations met to discuss energy policy as well as the possibility of a
regional alternative to the ICSID.94 At the conclusion of that meeting it was
announced that a working group would be assembled "whose task is to design a
legal mechanism to settle investor-state disputes related to the energy sector"
with the ultimate goal being the replacement of the ICSID "as the preferred
means to settle disputes between foreign energy companies and governments of
Latin America."95 This exploration of regional alternatives could become a trend
among signatories dissatisfied with results in the ICSID forum.
IV. NATIONS LOOK AHEAD: A HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER
Some commentators argue that treating water as a privatized commercial
commodity demeans its role as a human necessity and right by increasing prices
and decreasing access to some of the most desperate populations on the planet.96
In fact, as early as 1992 there was some discussion of the possibility of a human
right to water. 9 At that point, "A basic human right to water [was] as yet
imperfectly defined and established .. ." and even "the mere suggestion that one
state might have a right to receive water from another [was] quite
controversial." 98 Though this right has not found concrete articulation in the
intervening years, there have been several notable developments. In recognition
of the human rights implications of access to water, both the United Nations and
individual countries have begun to address these issues.
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A. The United Nations
Although the United Nations does not actually classify a human right to
water in any of its official or binding documents, it has articulated that right in
other publications.99 General Comment 15 of 2002, articulated as part of the
substantive issues arising in the implementation of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), is one such expression of the
human right to water. Article 15 states "[t]he human right to water entitles
everyone to sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible and affordable
water for personal and domestic uses. ' ° While the Comment is non-binding in
the traditional sense, it does contain some language of obligation. According to
the Comment, "[s]tate parties have immediate obligations in relation to the right
to water, such as the guarantee that the right will be exercised without
discrimination of any kind" as well as "a constant and continuing duty under the
Covenant to move as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards the full
realization of the right to water."''° General Comment 15 is nonbinding and
therefore imposes no legal obligations on member states, 0 2 though it does contain
an interesting approach to an existing international document acknowledged by
most nations.1
0 3
Another alternative, though admittedly less concrete, is to infer the right to
water from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
which guarantees the inherent right to life in Article 6(l).' 04 The inference is that
because water is necessary for life, there is a right to water inherently built in to
the right to life.'05
Both the ICCPR and ICESCR are applied to nations, but what about
transnational corporations? In 2003, the United Nations published a document
entitled the "Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and
Other Business Entities with Regard to Human Rights" which may provide some
guidelines for a human right to water as applied to these corporations.' °6 In
Section A, Paragraph 1 the Draft Norms state that "[w]ithin their respective
spheres of activity and influence, transnational corporations and other business
enterprises have the obligation to promote, secure the fulfillment of, respect,
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ensure respect of and protect human rights recognized in international as well as
national law, including the rights and interests of indigenous peoples and other
vulnerable groups."'' 7 In addition Section E Paragraph 12 states:
"Transnational corporations and other business enterprises shall respect
economic, social and cultural rights as well as civil and political rights
and contribute to their realization, in particular the rights to development,
adequate food and drinking water, the highest attainable standard of
physical and mental health, adequate housing, privacy, education,
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion and freedom of opinion and
expression, and shall refrain from actions which obstruct or impede the
realization of those rights."'
0 8
The norms are an attempt "to remedy the fact that international human rights
laws address the obligations and duties of states and international organizations,
but often fails to address transnational corporations."'' 9 All of these guidelines
and treaty provisions exist on the international level, a stage where consent of the
multitude of nations with differing priorities is difficult to come by and even
more difficult to enforce. On the national level, nations such as Uruguay and
South Africa have struggled to address the human right to water on their own.
B. Uruguay
On October 31, 2004, Uruguay became the first nation in the world to vote
on the human right to water ensuring that access to water and sanitation is
available to everyone and that when creating water policy social considerations
would take precedence over economic considerations. "0 In addition, this
referendum guaranteed that the service of water supply would be controlled
exclusively and directly by state legal persons and not by for-profit companies."'
The text of amendment 47 reads: "Water is a natural resource essential to life.
Access to drinking water and sewage system services, constitute a fundamental
human right.""' It also stipulates that "[e]very authorisation, concession or
permission that in any way violates these principles will be abandoned without
result" and that "[t]he public service of the sewage system and the supply of
107. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECSOC], Comm'n on Human Rights, Norms on the Responsibilities of
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water for human consumption will be provided exclusively and directly by legal
state representatives."'' 3
The popularity and drive for this amendment stems in part from a failed
contract with Aguas de la Costa (a subsidiary of multinational water company
Suez) and URAGAU, another large private water company. Instead of taking the
dispute to ICSID, some groups chose to take the issue directly to the people.
While the Constitutional amendment was not the reason cited for cancellation of
these contracts in Uruguay, it undoubtedly had an influence on their continued
viability and will prevent such contracts from being executed in the future. These
constitutional amendments are expected to result not only in the exclusion of
private water companies but also increased public participation and control over
Uruguay's water resources.." 4 This may become a trend in South America, as
"[p]eople in Argentina are now organizing to promote a similar constitutional
amendment on the right to water."''
5
C. South Africa
South Africa is another nation attempting to address the human right to water
internally. Section 24 of the Final Constitution of South Africa specifies:
"Everyone has the right to... (b) have the environment protected, for the
benefit of present and future generations, through reasonable and other
legislative matters that... (3) secure ecologically sustainable
development and use of natural resources while promoting justifiable
economic and social development."' "6
The legislative measures designed to protect this right include the National
Environmental Management Act (NEMA), Act 73 of 1998, and the National
Water Act (NWA), Act 36 of 1998. NEMA defines the environment as including
the land and water of the earth"7 and South African courts "have defined the
environment as inclusive of all conditions and influences affecting life and habits
of man.""' 8 In accordance with Section 24(b) of their Constitution, the South
African Legislature adopted the National Water Act (NWA), Act 36 of 1998. The
NWA is the "primary legislation pertaining to the regulation and conservation of
water within South Africa. . ." the purpose of which is "to ensure proper
management and protection of water resources."" 9 The NWA provides one of the
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most solid bases for an express human right to water available today. In its
preamble, the NWA states "water is a natural resource that belongs to all people"
acknowledges the government's "overall responsibility for and authority over the
nation's water resources and their use" and that "the ultimate aim of water
resource management is to achieve the sustainable use of water for the benefit of
all users. '
Not just the intent, but the content of the act also speaks volumes about the
affirmative role of the government in ensuring all individuals have access to
water. Chapter I, Section 3(1), entitled "Public Trusteeship of Nation's Water
Resources" provides "As the public trustee of the nation-s water resources the
National Government acting through the Minister must ensure that water is
protected, used, developed, conserved, managed and controlled in a sustainable
and equitable manner, for the benefit of all persons in accordance with its
constitutional mandate."12'
Extrapolating from these series of legislative and Constitutional
developments, an argument can be made that South Africa has thoroughly
articulated a human right to water in both its Constitution and supplemental
legislation. What may be more telling, however, is the manner in which these
developments have been applied in the South African judiciary.
Relatively recently, a South African court heard a case about the fundamental
right to have access to sufficient water and the right to human dignity. In a
judgment delivered on April 30, 2008 in the matter of Mazibuko v. City of
Johannesburg, the Court ruled that the City of Johannesburg's forced installation
of prepayment water meters was unconstitutional and unlawful, and also ordered
the City to provide local residents with fifty liters of free basic water per person
per day rather than the limit of twenty five which had been in existence.1
2
1
After a brief discussion of Article 15 and other international efforts to define
a right to water, the court concluded that "against the background of international
law, decisions of the various international institutions and the similar language
used in the Bill of Rights as that used in the various international instruments, the
State is obliged to provide free basic water to the poor."'23
This ultimate conclusion of the Court, that basic water for the poor is a
Constitutional requirement, is significant.24 Some believe the effect of this
decision will be to "put pressure on municipalities to extend free basic water" to
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the poor, many of whom currently lack access.12 In addition, the decision may
help protect vulnerable users from water disconnection in situations where they
cannot afford to pay. 126 Whatever the ultimate consequences, the Mazibuko case
provides an excellent demonstration of how a human right to water can have
meaning in a legal context.
D. Future Applications
The reality is that tensions between a human right to water and privatization
will continue to exist, if only because "the goals of the right to water do not
necessarily align with the goals of privatization."'12 As outlined above, there are
several approaches to recognition and application of a human right to water.
The Constitutional Referendum of Uruguay is probably the most direct and
explicit means used to date, though the long-term effects of the Amendment
remain to be seen. The South African NWA appears to be the most detailed and
explicit example of an individual nation's commitment to providing all its
citizens with access to water, though such a sweeping approach and obligation
may not be feasible in some developing nations. Finally, the more indirect
approach of Bolivian withdrawal from ICSID is not in itself an explicit
recognition of the human right to water, but rather an indication that such a right
may exist in the minds of the people, even if not explicitly stated. No one
approach to creating a human right to water is the answer, but the combination of
international pressure from the United Nations and Constitutional articulation
from individual states is a necessary first step in creating the contours of the
human right to water.
V. ALTERNATIVES: A NEW MODEL OF PUBLIC/PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP
With increasing pressure from a number of groups and publicized failures
such as those in Bolivia and Tanzania, the World Bank and IMF have begun to
reform their privatization and conditionality in lending policies in recent years.
At least one study has demonstrated a reduction in the use of conditionality
related to privatization combined with a greater focus on policies that are better
harmonized with the target country. 128
While privatization has its benefits and drawbacks, there are some models of
public/private partnership that seem to be humane, effective and profitable at the
same time. More often than not this involves the corporation in a more
managerial or consultancy role, with a fixed fee to manage certain portions of the
process. The government then sets the rates and overall policy for distribution
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and retains control over the assets. This way, individual citizens are not charged
excessive rates and countries benefit from the expertise and economy of scale
that these corporations have built. However, these types of purely managerial
agreements do not seem to address issues of corruption, and as shown in the
Mazibuko case, even publicly controlled systems can sometimes have adverse
effects on poor citizens.
Whether their role is managerial or concessionary, it seems clear that
investing companies should scale back expectations in this type of investment. In
addition, the World Bank and IMF should re-examine rules calling for the
complete exclusion of government subsidies, especially considering how
subsidies have worked with some success in developed nations such as the
United States. The World Bank and IMF also need to take a more individualized
approach towards lending projects, analyzing the culture and needs of each
individual borrower nation and determining on a one-time basis whether
privatization (or what level of privatization) would be most beneficial for all
those involved.
On the flip side, individual nations need to understand that when
implemented properly, privatization does not have to translate into rate increases
and citizen revolts. Sometimes, these issues can be avoided simply by demanding
a more thorough due diligence process before project implementation. For
example, BGT's involvement in the Tanzania Dar as Salaam Project was "based
on a presumption that the Project would generate regular and sustainable profit in
the mid-long term." BGT reached this conclusion "based on the information
provided to it during the bid process." '29 In the end, faced with massive shortfalls
in projections of costs and revenues, the project was deemed not viable. Had
information been more readily available or estimates been more accurate, some
of these disputes might have been avoided. This may be easier said than done,
however, as countries seeking the funding for these projects are often in dire need
of the promised improvements as soon as possible.
In summary, there are three major steps that can improve the success rate of
water distribution projects in developing nations and reduce the possibility of
disputes relating to water privatization programs in the future. The first is to
reduce the conditionality in lending that has been a hallmark in World Bank and
IMF lending policy over the last decade, a step that is already being slowly
implemented. " " The second is to continue to create norms and guidelines relating
to the human right to water on the national and international level similar to UN
Comment 15, the Transnational Norms, the Uruguay Constitution, and the South
African Constitution and National Water Act. The third is for nations to continue
to collaborate with private entities in finding a way to reap the benefits of
privatization without some of its downfalls, finding that delicate balance between
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project viability on one side and serving the nation's citizens on the other. There
is also a need not only for nation-corporation collaboration, but also increased
citizen participation.
In the future, conditionality could include requirements of citizen
participation in the planning and implementation process. Ideas such as this were
included in the UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public
Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental
Matters, also known as the Aarhus Convention. The Convention "establishes that
sustainable development can be achieved only through the involvement of all
stakeholders", and is "forging a new process for public participation in the
negotiation and implementation of international agreements." 3' Such citizen-
nation-corporation participation in each stage of the process could lead to better
results for everyone involved.
By looking into the future and taking each of these steps in a conscientious
way, nations, international organizations, and transnational corporation can all
successfully avoid the perils of privatization and more effectively distribute water
to the some of the world's neediest people in the process.
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